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here seems to be one standard concern about resentment: 
namely, that even in its most mundane forms, resentment 
amounts to a form of petty backbiting that wants and hates what it 
can't have.  Seen as a debilitating fixation on the past, resentment 
amplifies one's sense of injury alongside a desire for revenge.  
It is with these negative associations in mind that I suggest 
resentment is nonetheless a valuable critical resource for combating 
oppressive moral and religious norms.  Of course, my defense of 
resentment needs to hold up against Nietzsche's contempt, since his 
Genealogy of Morals presents to this day the most scathing critique 
of the backward-looking emotion's legitimacy.  I want to challenge 
this all too human view within philosophy that resentment is always 
already governed by the same underlying desire that governs 
ressentiment: namely revenge.1 
Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals attributes the historical and 
psychological lineage of Christian morality to the development of 
ressentiment: the chronic internalization of envy, cruelty, hatred, 
and resentment characteristic of disempowered people.  Nietzsche’s 
infamous genealogy, in other words, articulates Christian morality 
as developing out of the internalization of a desire for revenge and 
its attendant emotions and provides a new moral psychology 
                                                
1 Whereas I understand ressentiment as deriving from the internalization of a 
variety of affects according to a desire for revenge, Ruth Abbey understands 
ressentiment to be rooted in vanity ["The Roots of Ressentiment," New Nietzsche 
Studies 3, no. 3/4 (2009): 47-61]. 
T 
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according to which psychic life is the result of the repression of 
action.  The internalization of suffering, in other words, gives rise to 
a new value system, one that replaces healthy expression of force 
with the absorption of experience and out of which develops the 
psychic evolution of morality. 
In an effort to redeem resentment as an affirmation against 
this tendency, my work develops a subtle distinction within 
Nietzsche's work between ressentiment as an inherently 
disempowering internalization of suffering and resentment as a 
feeling of empowerment derived from struggle.  My work 
complements other philosophers who consider Nietzsche a 
philosopher of agonism—notably Gilles Deleuze, William Connoly 
and most recently Christa Acampora—and ultimately suggests that 
affirmative resentment is a type of empowering reaction that 
disrupts ressentiment's tendency to perpetuate the guilty pleasures 
of cruelty and self-loathing.  Reading Nietzsche with an eye for 
locating instances of affirmative reactions, I aim to upset the false 
antagonism between active and reactive as the definitive markers of 
empowerment and disempowerment.  The value of resentment can 
and should be measured by its capacity to bring about a feeling of 
empowerment for the subject, not by whether it is reactive.  This 
essay is therefore guided by the following question: Can resentment 
be cultivated and expressed as a life-affirming reaction without 
slipping into the mobilization of ressentiment as revenge against 
life?  
This paper develops three claims regarding the emancipatory 
potential of resentment and its antagonistic relationship towards 
ressentiment.  First, in Part One, in order to defend Nietzsche 
against charges of elitism, 2 I argue that while ressentiment is best 
                                                
2 I am not attempting here to fully reconcile Nietzsche's purported elitism with 
egalitarian ideals, although I think this has been done in a way by Christina 
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known as an existentially disempowering individual psychology, 
Nietzsche's appropriation of the term is intended to expose and 
critique hegemonic cultural practices of Christian mass morality, not 
the individual.  Second, in Part Two, even if we do accept individual 
reactivity as the source of ressentiment, I argue that this fact does 
not necessarily lead to the traditionally accepted view that 
resentment, as we experience it, is always a version of ressentiment.  
In order to redeem a structural possibility for empowered 
resentment within Nieztsche’s work I argue that ressentiment is a 
reaction against remembered, not current affronts.  Furthermore, I 
develop a functional distinction between passive and active forces 
that upsets traditional distinctions and introduce a new category of 
“active reactions.” Finally, in Part Three, I illustrate the prevalence 
of these active reactions—which correlate to what I call affirmative 
resentments at the psychological level—in Nietzsche’s work and 
argue that they resist ressentiment’s morality of suffering.  Nietzsche 
values plurality and affirmation over and against the purportedly 
reductive and conformist Christian moral psychology; with this 
valuation in mind, affirming one's own life can be understood as a 
condition of possibility for self-empowerment.  
My work brings to light novel ways that resentment as an 
interpersonal dynamic which desires the restoration of respect and 
ressentiment as that which desires power over others can be 
distinguished in Nietzsche's own work, a move which frees up the 
emotion as a possibly Nietzschean resource for empowerment.  Of 
course, there is always the risk that one’s resentments will develop 
into an addiction to suffering and moral righteousness that leads to 
a desire for power over others that remains uncritical of the kind of 
                                                                                                                      
Acampora in “Unlikely Illumination: Nietzsche and Frederick Douglass on Power, 
Struggle, and the Aisthesis of Freedom,” in Nietzsche and African American 
Thought, eds. Jacqueline Scott and A. Todd Franklin, (New York: SUNY Press, 
2006), 175-202.  
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power it wants.  I will not deny that resentment can be deeply 
misguided.  But I do want to suggest that when expressed as an 
immediate riposte to insult or injury, engaging one's resentments 
can also be an affirmative measure against what otherwise becomes 
internalized self-defeat.  
 
 
I.  Ressentiment as a World View 
 
I.1 The Genealogical Development of Ressentiment—R.  Lanier 
Anderson argues that the affect of ressentiment recruits a drive for 
power to shape a vague impulse for revenge against the strong into 
an incredibly subtle, highly structured, long-term program of 
activity that Nietzsche calls the slave revolt.3 Ressentiment is not a 
simple affect, nor a drive; it is nested in a myriad of simpler affects 
(envy, resentment, hatred, despair, anger), and a simpler drive: 
revenge.  Nietzschean moral psychology exposes Christian morality 
as developing out of a complicated organization of affects and drives.  
There are at least three levels of development in Genealogy: 1) 
ressentiment as individual psychology (the internalization of 
resentment, envy, hatred, revenge), 2) ressentiment as the 
mobilization of that psychology into the institution of Christianity 
(through the direction of the ascetic ideal), and finally 3) the legacy 
of that institution as mass psychology (that is, Christian morality).  
When Nietzsche criticizes the first type, he does so only in view of 
the third type.  This is to say that the problem with ressentiment is 
that its institutionalization via Christian morality actually redirects 
what could otherwise be attitudes critical of accepted norms.  Since 
revealing the critical potentiality of resentment is dependent upon 
its being distinguished from ressentiment as a disempowering 
                                                
3 R. Lanier Anderson, "Nietzsche's Conception of the Self" (lecture, New School for 
Social Research, March 24, 2011).  
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psychological type, and since we cannot understand how individual 
psychology becomes oppressive without understanding its 
development into the internalization of morality, I will address these 
three stages in turn. 
Once we can see the complexity of ressentiment we will be in 
a position to view the ways in which the affect of resentment is not 
always already in the service of something like a deep desire for a 
slave revolt.  Nietzsche's moral psychology allows for a plurality of 
reactions borne out of an even greater plurality of affect/drive 
combinations.  Not all resentment in other words, leads to 
ressentiment.  
 
I.2 Psychology of the Disempowered—The internalization of 
suffering develops as a defensive mechanism in the face of 
overwhelming force.  Unable to resist the force of others, the weak 
swallow rather than act upon vengeful desires.  With this 
internalization, the healthy expression of force and power is 
replaced with self-defeat and defensive denial.  Defensive self-
negation nonetheless continues to desire power but must seek 
“subterranean gratifications" through fantasies of revenge and self-
flagellation (Genealogy of Morals II §15).4 Seeking power without 
force and through the internalization of instincts gives rise to the 
chronic passive-aggressive backbiting characteristic of 
ressentiment.5 The internalization of resentment effectively replaces 
                                                
4 Friedrich Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, trans. W. Kaufmann and R.J. 
Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1989). 
5 See Max Scheler's analysis of the emotion in his book Ressentiment, [trans. 
W.W. Holdheim, fourth printing (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2007), 
39].  I borrow the term backbiting from Nicholas Birns in his critique of Scheler's 
reading of Nietzschean ressentiment.  See Nicholas Birns, "Ressentiment and 
Counter-Ressentiment: Nietzsche, Scheler, and the Reaction Against Equality," in 
Nietzsche Circle (September 2005), 7.  Available online at  
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action with an addiction to cruelty.  Those who lacked “external 
enemies and resistances” took to hurting themselves (Genealogy of 
Morals II §16).   
Nietzsche’s critique of morality as the illegitimate spawn of 
ressentiment is most often remembered and valued for its claim 
about the pathetic and disempowering nature of people overcome by 
the affect.  Even before Genealogy Nietzsche had imagined a certain 
type of person whose ability to feel good about herself depended on 
the ability to detract value in others.  Nietzsche says, in Human, All 
too Human, that “there are not a few people (perhaps it is even most 
people) who, in order to maintain in themselves a sense of self-
respect . . . are obliged to disparage and diminish in their minds all 
the other people they know” (“Moral Sensation” §62).6 This 
disparaging and detracting attitude towards others is typical of the 
self-deluded character of Nietzsche's concept of ressentiment as an 
individualized psychological type.  
The contemptible connotation of ressentiment following its 
genealogical introduction by Nietzsche has radically changed the 
way moral theorists evaluate the moral value of resentment.7 
                                                                                                                      
http://www.nietzschecircle.com/RessentimentMaster.pdf.  Birns' essay offers an 
excellent distinction between Nietzsche's and Scheler's understandings of 
ressentiment, a distinction missing in much of the literature on resentment.   
6 Friedrich Nietzsche, “On the History of Moral Sensations,” in Human, All To 
Human, trans. R.J. Hollingdale  (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1996). 
7 Nietzsche was not the first to use ressentiment as a term for disempowered 
resentment.  Søren Kierkegaard noted the hateful and leveling effects of the affect 
in The Present Age: "Thus ressentiment becomes the constituent principle of want 
of character, which from utter wretchedness tries to sneak itself a position, all the 
time safeguarding itself by conceding that it is less than nothing. . . . And 
ressentiment not only defends itself against all existing forms of distinction but 
against that which is still to come.  The ressentiment which is establishing itself is 
the process of leveling, and while a passionate age storms ahead setting up new 
things and tearing down old, razing and demolishing as it goes, a reflective and 
passionless age does exactly the contrary: it hinders and stifles all action; it levels.  
Leveling is a silent, mathematical, and abstract occupation which shuns 
upheavals” [trans. Alexander Dru (New York: Harper Perennial, 1962), 51].  In a 
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Whereas the affect had once been defended as deriving from a 
deeper desire for justice, resentment has become synonymous with 
the self-defeating and delusional characteristics of ressentiment.  
This conflation, I argue, is a result of both a certain misreading of 
Nietzsche and a conflation of the three levels of ressentiment.  First, 
those who read Nietzsche as an unapologetically elitist thinker of the 
Übermensch undoubtedly read ressentiment as the resentment of a 
pathetic underclass.  In other words, what had hitherto been widely 
understood as a common and morally grounded response to wrong 
is now portrayed within certain philosophical discourses as a 
morally and psychologically repugnant character trait of the weak.8 
Second, the commonly accepted view that Nietzschean ressentiment 
manifests only as an individualized character is itself a result of the 
unjustified conflation of what is properly understood as the three 
levels of ressentiment already mentioned: an individual 
psychological type, the institutional mobilization of this 
psychological type through organized religion, and finally the legacy 
of Christianity as a mass psychology of suffering.  
                                                                                                                      
later translation, ressentiment is translated as “envy” [see Søren Kierkegaard, Two 
Ages, ed. and trans. Howard Hong and Edna Hong (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1978)].  
8 Bishop Joseph Butler, Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant each believed that 
resentment was inherently linked to a desire for justice.  In Anthropology from a 
Pragmatic Point of View, Kant says "So hatred arising from an injustice we have 
suffered—that is, the desire for vengeance—is a passion that proceeds irresistibly 
from the nature of man; and, malicious as this passion is, maxims of reason are 
nevertheless entwined with the inclination by virtue of the legitimate appetite for 
justice, whose analogue it is.  This is why the desire for vengeance is one of the 
most vehement and deeply rooted passions: even when it seems to be extinct, a 
secret hatred, called resentment, is always left over, like fire smoldering under the 
ashes" [trans. Mary J. Gregor (The Hague: Martinius Nijhoff Publishers, 1974), 
137].  See also Joseph Butler’s Fifteen Sermons Preached at Rolls Chapel (1729) 
and Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759).  For an excellent 
comparison of Butler's and Smith's views on the moral justification of resentment, 
see Alice MacLachlan, "Resentment and Moral Judgment in Smith and Butler," 
The Adam Smith Review 5 (2010). 
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Disparaging descriptions of subjects of ressentiment 
exemplify Fredrick Appel's concerns about Nietzsche's elitism.  
Appel says:  
 
Nietzsche's great concern is for the flourishing of those few whom he 
considers exemplary of the human species.  He believes that we can—
and should—make qualitative distinctions between higher, admirable 
modes of human existence and lower contemptible ones, and that these 
distinctions should compel his target readership to foster higher forms 
of human life at whatever cost to the many who cannot aspire thereto.9 
 
This type of reading understands Nietzsche’s philosophical project 
as a kind of self-help or therapy for the privileged few.  But reading 
ressentiment as a personal character type to be avoided at all costs 
ignores the critical thrust of Genealogy of Morals.  That is, the 
critique of ressentiment is intended as a critique of morality, which 
is to say, a critique of hegemonic systems of belief. 
While Nietzsche uses ressentiment to expose a morality of 
equality premised on the denial of an instinct for freedom,10 Max 
Scheler uses the concept to attack humanist movements 
characteristic of his time, and most recently, Wendy Brown has 
recuperated the term in order to criticize the way liberalism 
promotes political identities that maintain injury as a political 
status, a move she claims is necessarily disempowering.11 In their 
own ways, all three thinkers identify a class of subjects inflicted with 
ressentiment in order to critique a cultural structure that incites 
misguided and self-negating demands for power.  Against the 
acknowledged structure of domination, my work hopes to show that 
resentment can be recuperated as an empowering riposte.   
                                                
9 Fredrick Appel, Nietzsche Contra Democracy (New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1999), 1. 
10 One of the most explicit accounts of Nietzsche's criticism of Christianity as a will 
to equality that seeks vengeance against all who remain above its leveling effects is 
"On the Tarantulas" in Thus Spoke Zarathustra.  
11 Wendy Brown, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).  
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Before turning to the ascetic mobilization of the individual 
psychology of ressentiment, I want to reiterate that the purpose of 
Nietzsche's genealogy is not to criticize individual people who 
exemplify these “oppressive instincts that thirst for reprisal,” 
individuals he calls “the descendents of every kind of European and 
non-European slavery” (Genealogy of Morals I §11).  He himself 
says, “I am far from blaming individuals for the calamity of 
millennia” (Ecce Homo “Wise” §8).12 Rather, I read Nietzsche as 
being interested in the moral psychology out of which such 
individuals have been bred to feel their weakness in a self-indulgent 
and self-denying fashion.  Far from elitism, what we find in 
Genealogy is that ressentiment imprisons all human beings; we 
suffer from a psychology that favors inwardness: “The meaning of 
culture” is after all “the reduction of the beast of prey ‘man’ to a 
tame and civilized animal” (I §11).  Nietzsche is worried about the 
fact that subjects of ressentiment use internalized suffering and 
insatiable revenge in order to feel they are owed equality,13 yet they 
simultaneously deny themselves the kind of active response to 
suffering through which they might attain a fair fight (or, if one 
wants to push the democratized reading of Nietzsche, equal standing 
for themselves).  Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals criticizes the 
ascetic ideal's redirection of desire towards suffering.  With this in 
mind, I will now argue that ressentiment is best understood as a 
result of a certain kind of pedagogy of desire.  Certainly, if we read 
Nietzsche as deriving ressentiment from a weakness in character, 
then emancipatory and egalitarian efforts are more easily censured 
as forms of mediocrity and mass complacency, and Nietzsche's 
elitism emerges.  Against this trend, I read Nietzsche's criticism of 
                                                
12 Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, trans. W. Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1989). 
13 This is precisely that with which Brown's critique of liberalism is concerned. 
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the ascetic ideal as a tool for criticizing the legitimacy of religions 
that organize and siphon the energies of the weak.  
 
I.3 Learning to Desire Suffering: The Ascetic Ideal—In Genealogy, 
Nietzsche identifies ascetic priests as the organizers of ressentiment.  
In the genealogical sense, Nietzschean ressentiment is an oppressive 
tactic of the teachers of asceticism, that is, ascetic priests who 
Nietzsche finds most contemptible (Genealogy of Morals I).  The 
priests themselves are not exempt from the psychology of 
ressentiment (they share its disease with the weak) and they 
function as its guiding principle.  Having developed the ability to 
rule from a position of self-hatred, the ascetic priests are especially 
resourceful.  The individual psychological type with a propensity for 
self-hate can therefore invert values only insofar as the 
internalization of instincts can be further mobilized as an institution 
that can then protect these weak creatures of conscience.  The 
ascetic priests endorse and validate the natural tendencies of the 
weak as moral characteristics of the “good.”   Nietzsche calls the 
mobilization of ressentiment “bad conscience”: 
 
These fearful bulwarks with which the political organization protected 
itself against the old instincts of freedom—punishments belong to these 
bulwarks—brought about that all those instincts for wild, free, prowling 
man turned back against man himself.  Hostility, cruelty, joy in 
persecuting, in attacking, in change, in destruction—all this turned 
against the possessors of such instincts: that is the origin of the “bad 
conscience.” (Genealogy of Morals II §16) 
 
This politically mobilized replacement and its resulting organized 
affective state results in the “slave revolt”: a growing class of 
disenfranchised persons who use their deep-seated dissatisfaction to 
subvert the standard values of the strong and noble class.  This 
festering mix of hatred and envy inverts the formerly valued 
experience of physical force of the strong privileged few (the noble 
Hunt 
 
128 
class) into the Christian moral category “evil,” while “good” comes to 
designate self-imposed powerlessness masking a deeper desire for 
cruelty (Genealogy of Morals II §6).  Morality, Nietzsche argues, is 
therefore a dubious enterprise premised on a fictitiously pure notion 
of the good or the just that turns out to be merely the vengeful 
fantasies of the weak.14 
One way the ascetic ideal comes to organize the experience of 
the individual subject is by covering over the pain of repression with 
a new pain: guilt.  Nietzsche explains how this purported 
“overcoming” takes place: 
 
Man, suffering from himself in some way or other but in any case 
physiologically like an animal in a cage, uncertain why or wherefore, 
thirsting for reasons—reasons relieve—thirsting, too, for remedies and 
narcotics, at last takes counsel with one who knows hidden things, too—
and behold! he receives a hint, he receives from his sorcerer, the ascetic 
priest, the first hint as to the “cause” of his suffering: he must seek it in 
himself, in some guilt, in a piece of the past, he must understand his 
suffering as a punishment. (Genealogy of Morals III §20) 
 
                                                
14 If I am to reveal the power of Nietzsche's critique of ressentiment as deriving 
from three stages of ressentiment, then I must makes sense of the shift from 
psychological vulnerability to its mobilization according to principles of the ascetic 
ideal.  One might rightly ask how ascetic priests come to exert power over others if 
they themselves suffer from the same vulnerability.  The affliction of nihilism is 
not a single state of being, but rather a starting point for the reevaluation of values 
that captures a range of capabilities and possibilities.  Certainly nihilism as a 
whole acknowledges a world without inherent value or truth (an 
acknowledgement that Nietzsche respects), but only certain forms of nihilism 
cling to the ascetic ideal as the only way to interpret suffering (the source of 
Nietzsche's disdain).  Whereas the passive nihilist is more inclined to remain 
chained to an insatiable desire for suffering and the denial of life, the active 
nihilist attempts to surpass rather than succumb to his pathos and emerges with 
an inclination to re-interpret life in different ways.  Ascetic priests remain stuck 
between active and passive nihilism; their will to power is stronger than the herd's 
but not strong enough to denounce the ascetic ideals.  Through their own 
cleverness, priests capitalize on the vulnerability of others and thereby attain a 
precarious sense of power for themselves through the redirection of desire.  See 
Grace Hunt, "Will to Power as Interpretation: Unearthing the Authority of 
Nietzsche’s Re-Evaluation of Values," Symposia (2010): 51-68. 
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By overriding an earlier repression with guilt, suffering is 
reinterpreted anew.  Fear and punishment are the new pain that 
allow “life again [to become] very interesting: awake, everlastingly 
awake, sleepless, glowing charred, spent and yet not weary” 
(Genealogy of Morals III §20).  The ascetic ideal replaces one 
symptom with another and infuses suffering with new meaning.  
More specifically, the ascetic ideal redirects suffering back towards 
the sufferer by introducing the concept of sin and its correlate, guilt.  
One must not underestimate the power of the ascetic ideal: it 
redirects desires.  Pain is sought as that which liberates the sufferer 
from one kind of pain while tethering the sufferer to another.  The 
ascetic ideal creates a kind of death-drive, a compulsion towards 
pain that might deaden something more intolerable, namely the 
repression of instincts.  The ascetic priests' medication “makes the 
sick sicker” because it “does not aim at curing the sickness but at 
combating the depression by relieving and deadening its 
displeasure” (Genealogy of Morals III §20).  Repressed feelings are 
re-felt and used against oneself as a kind self-control attained 
through the experience of guilt.  
The shift from the individual psychology to the mass 
psychology of Christianity is in part accounted for through the 
organization of ressentiment according to the ascetic ideal.  The 
ascetic priests, far from being mysterious actors, are weak, cruel, 
and clever characters that experience power for themselves through 
shepherding the weaker masses.  The priests have not escaped the 
repression of instincts, but through the organization of others, gain a 
false sense of freedom.  Meanwhile, the organization of ressentiment 
effectively extinguishes the possibility for creative action for the 
weak by mobilizing ressentiment into a new relation to suffering.   
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I.4 Morality as Hegemony: Nietzsche’s Critique of Christianity—
The third element of Nietzsche's critique of Christian morality 
focuses on the legacy of the inversion of values: the mass psychology 
that privileges charity, pity, and forgiveness as virtues of the ascetic 
ideal; virtues intended to assuage guilt.  At this level, Nietzsche's 
critique of ressentiment is revealed as a critique of Christian 
morality as that which values and crystallizes certain responses to 
suffering.  Having explored the role of ressentiment and suffering 
within Christianity in the previous section, I now suggest that the 
reification of ressentiment as a mere character trait deactivates the 
affirmative potentiality of resentment.  Claiming that resentment 
can be deactivated admittedly assumes that there is active 
resentment; I will return to and develop this claim in Part Three.    
Rather than attributing disempowered reactions merely to 
weakness of the individual, I understand ressentiment as the 
orchestrated redirection of desire towards the will to nothingness.  
The problem of ressentiment is best understood as the socialization 
of weakness rather than its individualization.  Moreover, socialized 
ressentiment actually disarms what could otherwise represent 
particular resentments expressing active dissent or refusal of 
accepted norms.  That is, if we understand the problem of 
ressentiment as the redirecting of desire away from emancipatory 
projects, we can see that ressentiment is an obvious threat to 
reactive feelings that express individual force and creativity.  
Reading the relationship between resentment and ressentiment in 
this way honors the point I made about Nietzsche earlier—that he is 
not interested in further disenfranchising the weak, but rather in 
critiquing the origins of morality that prevent creative and self-
fashioning projects of the individual.  
My reading of the problem of ressentiment takes seriously the 
way that the prohibitive ascetic ideal creates desires that are 
Redeeming Resentment 
 
131 
themselves disempowering.  When resentments are assimilated and 
delegitimized under the veil ressentiment, what might have 
otherwise been a valid performance and affirmation is rendered 
indistinguishable from mere grievance or gripe.  The demands of 
ressentiment, I argue below, are projections of internalized self-
dissatisfaction rather than the externalization of self-worth.  
Ressentiment becomes a personal assertion of pain or a naturalized 
state since ressentiment involves “construing inequality, 
subordination, marginalization, and social conflict as personal and 
individual, on the one hand, or as natural, religious, or cultural on 
the other.”15 Reactions experienced through ressentiment lack the 
potential for self-expression because they are always already shaped 
by the interests of the ascetic ideal.  But whereas resentment has 
also been understood as a desire for justice,16 Nietzsche’s work 
shows us that Christian ideals divest reactions of any such 
affirmative potential.  What I am suggesting here is that expressive 
negative reactions can be affirmative for Nietzsche, but not for 
Christian mass psychology.  To develop this claim we must turn to 
the psychological and physiological underpinnings of ressentiment: 
memory and the concept of force.  These two elements will enable us 
to better understand the inner workings of Nietzsche’s psychology of 
suffering.  
 
 
II.  Action and Reaction in Genealogy of Morals 
 
II.1 Ressentiment as a Reaction against Memory—If ressentiment is 
the internalization of resentments, how are we to distinguish 
symptoms of ressentiment and reactions of resentment? Nietzsche 
gives us many clues, but one of the most telling is found in “On 
                                                
15 Brown, States of Injury, 15. 
16 See note 8.  
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Redemption”, where Zarathustra says: “'It was'—that is the name of 
the will's gnashing teeth and most secret melancholy.  Powerless 
against what has been done, he is an angry spectator of all that is 
past” (Part II “On Redemption”).17 Subjects of ressentiment are 
afflicted by memories of the past.  But as long as events and 
excitations are remembered, nothing can be digested.  A person who 
can't forget has lost the ability to “assimilate and appropriate the 
things of the past . . . and transform it” (“On the Uses and 
Disadvantages of History for Life” §1).18  Pain is intimately related to 
memory, however, and in an obvious prelude to Freud, Nietzsche 
announces, “if something is to stay in the memory it must be burned 
in: only that which never ceases to hurt stays in the memory” 
(Genealogy of Morals II §3).  These unforgettable and irrepressible 
memories obscure the source of the threat: memories—not external 
stimuli—confront sufferers of ressentiment.19 With all past 
experiences kept conscious, the psyche is overwhelmed by 
experience, and since experience and memory are no longer 
distinguished, everything is perceived as a painful affront.  The 
undigested memory traces eventually creep into conscious life, 
making it insufferable.  
Despite Nietzsche's description of ressentiment as an 
intestinal problem, the incapacity to forget is a kind of psychical 
powerlessness, not a physical affliction: failure to digest is the failure 
to forget, or to allow things to become unconscious.  In Genealogy, 
the noble man avoids indigestion with “the perfect functioning of the 
regulating unconscious instincts” (I §2).  The unconscious is 
                                                
17 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. 
W. Kaufmann (New York: Penguin Viking Inc. 1982).  
18 Friedrich Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
19 In Deleuze's words, "the man of ressentiment is like a dog, a kind of dog which 
only reacts to traces (for example, a bloodhound)" [Nietzsche and Philosophy, 
trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 115]. 
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essential for psychological health, since “all perfect acts are 
unconscious and no longer subject to will; consciousness is the 
expression of an imperfect and often morbid state in a person” (Will 
to Power §289).20 Before Nietzsche had developed an understanding 
of the psychological health of forgetting, he understood forgetting as 
a healthy relation to history, and as a requirement for happiness.  In 
“The Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” he says, “one who 
cannot leave himself behind on the threshold of the moment and 
forget the past . . . will never know what happiness is” (§1).  Later in 
Ecce Homo, the inability to forget means that one “cannot get rid of 
anything, [cannot] get over anything, [cannot] repel anything—
everything hurts.  Men and things obtrude too closely; experiences 
strike one too deeply; memory becomes a festering wound” (“Wise” 
§6).  This wound allows too many experiences to enter and calcify 
into what Deleuze calls: “the sclerosis . . . of his consciousness, the 
rapidity with which every excitation sets and freezes within him, the 
weight of traces that invade him are so many cruel sufferings.”21 
Nothing can be invested, divested or healed; everything becomes a 
scar.  The whole world becomes a source of overwhelming hatred.  
Deleuze describes the accusatory character of ressentiment’s 
memories: 
 
And, more deeply, the memory trace is full of hatred in itself and by 
itself.  It is venomous and depreciative because it blames the object in 
order to compensate for its own inability to escape from the traces of the 
corresponding excitation.  This is why ressentiment's revenge, even 
when it is realized, remains “spiritual,” imaginary and symbolic in 
principle.22 
 
This failure to forget therefore results in an inability to distinguish 
those conscious stimuli (affronts) that would otherwise provoke 
                                                
20 Friedrich Nietzsche, Will to Power, trans. W. Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1967). 
21 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 116.  
22 Ibid. 
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appropriately resentful reactions.  Hatred grows out of this 
incapacity to resist, as is the case with the psychological type “the 
Redeemer,” a person whose overwhelming experience of pain results 
in his or her hatred of the world.  Nietzsche says in The Antichrist, 
“The instinctive hatred for reality: a consequence of an extreme 
capacity for suffering and excitement which no longer wants any 
contact at all because it feels every contact too deeply” (§30).23 The 
subject of ressentiment suffers from an inability to digest 
experience, an incapacity that leaves no energy for active 
retaliation.24 
With this understanding of ressentiment as internalized and 
subsequently projected suffering, I will now develop a crucial 
distinction within Nietzsche's pluralistic understanding of reaction.  
 
II.2 Passive versus Active Reactions—Having developed the 
problem of ressentiment as the problem of internalized suffering, 
and in order to argue that ressentiment does not exhaust all of 
reactivity's resources, I develop a further distinction in Nietzsche’s 
moral psychology between active and passive reactions.  
Resentment, I argue, is an active and immediate mode of resistance 
                                                
23 Friedrich Nietzsche, Antichrist, in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. W. Kaufmann 
(New York: Penguin Viking Inc. 1982). 
24 Of course, if the subject can find an external “cause” of suffering, the suffering 
can then be released, the subject can “vent his affects” (Genealogy of Morals III 
§15).  Zarathustra calls the tendency to retroactively find a target to blame the 
"spirit of revenge." Wherever there is suffering, there is for this spirit as desire to 
punish, "for 'punishment' is that revenge calls itself; with a hypocritical lie it 
creates a good conscience for itself" (Part II "On Redemption").  This projected 
hated (originally aimed at oneself) results in "imaginary revenge" that nonetheless 
is unable to assuage the original displeasure but merely overwhelms itself with 
new hatred (Genealogy of Morals, I §10).  Deleuze calls this revenge symbolic: the 
bad conscience blames others as a way to compensation for the inability to forget 
the trace of the experience.  One is trying to avenge the inability to forget by 
blaming the excitation itself.  That is why the revenge is symbolic or imaginary 
(Nietzsche and Philosophy, 116). 
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that affirms its own particularity against the conformist tendencies 
of passive reaction.  
While the subject of ressentiment is denied a “true reaction, 
that of deeds” (Genealogy of Morals I §10), Nietzsche’s psychology 
of reactive force complicates the attempt to rigidly distinguish action 
and reaction in terms of creativity and passivity.  The ability to 
discriminate between action and reaction in terms of creativity is 
also obscured by Nietzsche's understanding of health as a matter of 
balancing acted and un-acted, or active and passive reactions.  
Rather than understand this ambiguity as a failure, the difference 
between active and reactive can be clarified at the underlying 
physiological level of force.  Deleuze's account of the central role of 
reactive forces in Nietzsche's psychology is helpful: 
 
In the normal or healthy state the role of reactive forces is always to limit 
action.  They divide, delay or hinder it by means of another action whose 
effects we feel.  But conversely, active forces produce a burst of 
creativity: they set it off at a chosen instant, at a favorable moment, in a 
given direction, in order to carry out a quick and precise piece of 
adjustment.  In this way a riposte is formed.  This is why Nietzsche can 
say: “The true reaction is that of action” ([Genealogy of Morals] I §10).  
The active type, in this sense, is not a type that only contains active 
forces, it expresses the “normal” relation between reaction that delays 
action and an action that precipitates reaction.  The master is said to 
react precisely because he acts his reactions.25 
 
A reactive force is active insofar as it resists other forces that seek to 
overpower or outnumber it.  Through resistance, active reaction 
thereby distinguishes itself.26 Conversely, passive reactive forces 
cannot resist, so they seek to bond with like forces in order to 
accumulate collective power.  The passive forces “can bring about 
the disintegration, the scission of superior forces; [passive forces] 
                                                
25 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 111.  
26 Ibid., 63.  
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can explode the energy [active forces] have accumulated.”27 A 
passive force cannot itself accumulate power, it can only divide and 
separate active forces; by dividing and separating creative 
accumulation, passive reactions can combine to create a force 
capable of preventing creative force.  Passive reactions are able to 
level differentiating forces without exerting the force required to 
resist.  Passive reactions combine and accumulate collective power 
without strength.  Passive reactions are analogous in this way to the 
psychology of ressentiment.  Nietzsche says, “Just the opposite of all 
wrestling, of all feeling-oneself-in-a-struggle has here become 
instinct: the incapacity for resistance becomes morality” (Antichrist 
§29).  The analogy enables an understanding of the relation between 
the capacity to rule from a position of weakness and the creation of 
morality.  Crucially, however, for my work, it also reveals active 
reactions at the heart of Nietzsche's moral psychology. 
Ressentiment and its underlying passively reactive forces gain 
power by lowering and leveling expressions of resistance and 
difference.  The will to power of passive reaction, in other words, is 
not creative of new meaning.  Deleuze describes passive reactions as 
that which decompose contestation: 
 
They decompose; they separate active force from what it can do; they 
take away part or almost all of its power.  In this way reactive forces do 
not become active but, on the contrary, they make the active forces 
rejoin them and become reactive in a new sense . . . an active force 
becomes reactive when reactive forces separate it from what it can do. 
[Nietzsche] is careful never to present the triumph of reactive forces as 
the putting together of a force superior to active force, but as a 
subtraction or division. . . . And in each case this separation rests on a 
fiction, a mystification, or a falsification.28 
 
                                                
27 Ibid.  Interestingly, active forces, when they appear in a subject of ressentiment, 
are themselves separated and turned back against the subject. 
28 Ibid., 57. 
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Passive reactions triumph only insofar as they can divide and level 
active forces without having to assert their own power.29  
The genealogical analogy of the “triumph of the weak as 
weak” is the point of Genealogy of Morals: that is, passive forces 
triumph by separating active forces, not by forming a superior force, 
and that the resulting leveling is best understood as a problem 
arising and manifesting itself at the level of individual force.30 
Against those who read Nietzsche's commitment to the plurality of 
types as hierarchical in the elitist sense, I read his worry as directed 
against the leveling of creativity and difference at the level of the will 
to power; in Nietzsche's words, “the will to be oneself, to stand out” 
(“Skirmishes of an Untimely Man” §37).  Nietzsche's psychology of 
force expresses concern for the maintenance of productive struggle, 
“to 'reconcile' nothing, a tremendous variety that is nevertheless the 
opposite of chaos” (Ecce Homo “Clever” §9).  Passive reactions 
attempt to incorporate and reconcile all contest and struggle.  Active 
reactions take up the struggle and through it, preserving the viability 
of challenge, maintain a flexible enough contest to “generate 
decisions about excellence that are relative not only to past 
performances but also in accordance with new standards produced 
through the contest itself.”31 Active resistances enable a plurality of 
new meaning.   
As a way to illustrate this point, in “Wanderer and his 
Shadow” Nietzsche describes two ways the indignant person can 
overcome envy: either by pushing down the envied other to restore 
the lowest common denominator of equality, or raise herself up to 
the height of the other (§29).32 Against those who misread Nietzsche 
                                                
29 Ibid., 58-59. 
30 Ibid., 57. 
31 Acampora, “Unlikely Illumintations,” 182.  
32 Freidrich Nietzsche, “Wanderer and his Shadow” in Human, all too Human, 
trans. R.J. Hollingdale  (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996).  
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as a philosopher of domination, I understand his committed struggle 
against equalization as a mode of affirmative individuation.  This 
individuation entails an elastic space of contest within which new 
values can arise.33 Empowering values are determined through a 
feeling of freedom, not a feeling of suffering.34 This feeling of 
freedom is not independent of suffering, however.  Nietzsche 
suggests that although we tend to attribute freedom to 
independence, the opposite might also be true: “that he is always 
living in manifold dependence but regards himself as free when, out 
of long habituation, he no longer perceives the weight of the chains” 
(“Wanderer and his Shadow” §10).  Freedom is also felt when the 
weight of oppression is no longer experienced.  But if this is the case, 
we are still missing the evaluative tool with which to distinguish 
empowered freedom from disempowered freedom.  In Part Three, I 
will argue that the capacity to resist the mobilization of one's 
resistances into the moral fabric of ressentiment is ultimately an 
ability to affirm oneself in the face of injury.  It is at the level of 
experience—not the underlying forces—that will enable us to better 
understand how our resentments can be expressive of freedom. 
In turning to the underlying level of forces at work in 
Nietzsche's physiology of psychology, we find that productive and 
destructive struggle or empowering and disempowering reactivity is 
measured according to a standard of individuality and particularity.  
This new distinction between active and passive reactions 
acknowledges the inalienable role of reaction in our lives, provoking 
                                                
33 Acampora, “Unlikely Illumintations,” 180. 
34 Acampora offers an excellent analysis of how this struggle for individuation and 
the resulting "aisthesis of freedom" is not necessarily at odds with the pursuit of 
meaningful community.  On the contrary, she believes that the feeling of freedom 
realized in struggle "educes erotic and imaginative resources vital for shaping a 
collective identity of who we are and the future we want as ours." See Acampora, 
“Unlikely Illumintations,” 176.  
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further investigation into the value of reactions insofar as they 
maintain difference.  
 
 
III.  Affirmative Reactions 
 
III.1 Ripostes—Having hopefully developed the depth and 
complexity of Nietzschean moral psychology, this section reveals 
that in addition to contemptuous ressentiment as an individual 
psychological type, there exists in Nietzsche’s writings a character 
type that rebukes the seriousness of others and thereby disrupts the 
leveling of reaction with a plurality of what Nietzsche might call 
healthy reactions.  
Within Nietzschean moral psychology of action and reactive 
force, we find that not all forms of reaction are to be reviled as self-
defeating and self-denying.  We find a plurality of active reactions 
that I argue function as creative disruptions of ressentiment; 
disruptions that are experienced as what Acampora calls “the 
transformative and liberating affects of the felt quality of the 
experience of struggle.”35 Health for Nietzsche includes at least three 
different kinds of response to injury and insult: distance, digestion, 
and riposte.  All three are healthy reactions, but the riposte, I aim to 
show, is an affirmative kind of resentment.      
Resentment acts in the service of releasing the self-inflicted 
revenge (first developed in Human, all too Human) and thereby 
prevents the internalization of resentment and its transformation 
into a pathological condition.  Seeking and enacting revenge, despite 
its negative connotations elsewhere, releases the tension of an 
otherwise seething desire for revenge: 
 
To desire revenge and then to carry out revenge means to be the victim 
of a vehement attack of fever which then, however, passes: but to desire 
                                                
35 Ibid., 184. 
Hunt 
 
140 
to revenge without possessing the strength and courage to carry out 
revenge means to carry about a chronic illness, a poisoning of body and 
soul.  Morality, which looks only at the intentions, assesses both cases 
equally; in the ordinary way the former case is assessed as being the 
worse (on account of the evil consequences which the act of revenge will 
perhaps produce). (“Moral Sensations” §60) 
 
This distinction between realized (externalized) and unrealized 
(internalized) desires for revenge is essential to Nietzsche's 
understanding of health.  Actively carrying out revenge produces a 
sudden and brief illness that can quickly expel the poison of 
internalized revenge.  Left as an unrealized desire, the condition 
becomes chronic.  Revenge, in this passage is viewed as that which 
enables the poison of ressentiment to be released.  Revenge, an 
enacted resentment, attempts to restore a balance of health.  
In “The Wanderer and his Shadow” (§33) Nietzsche again 
acknowledges the value of actual (instead of imaginary) revenge.  
Interestingly, he makes a familiar distinction between immediate 
and deliberate revenge.  He suggests that we can “distinguish first of 
all that defensive return blow which one delivers even against lifeless 
objects (moving machinery, for example) which have hurt us: the 
sense of our counter-action is to put a stop to the injury by putting a 
stop to the machine.” The immediate and instinctual response is 
merely preventative.  For Nietzsche, anyone with a sense of self-
preservation will act in this way, for this counter-action requires 
little thought and thought only regarding oneself: “self-preservation 
alone has here set its clockwork of reason in motion, and that one 
has fundamentally been thinking, not of the person who caused the 
injury, but only of oneself: we act thus without wanting to do harm 
in return, but only so as to get out with life and limb.” The only 
“thought” that occurs in this instinctual or life-preserving act is a 
thought about the force required to survive.  Revenge, now 
contrasted to the instinctive return blow, takes time because it 
requires thought about the other person's vulnerability, a reflection 
Redeeming Resentment 
 
141 
that is not immediate when other-directed.  The presupposition of 
the second kind of deliberate revenge “is a reflection over the other’s 
vulnerability and capacity for suffering: one wants to hurt.” Self-
preservation and deliberate revenge are distinctions found within 
Nietzsche's understanding of revenge.  
We find in Thus Spoke Zarathustra’s “On the Adder’s Bite” 
the complicated nature of returning the 'favor' of the insult so as to 
avoid revenge altogether.  Zarathustra advises that anger is a best 
response for an enemy, rather than putting him to shame.  He says, 
“And if you are cursed, I do not like it that you want to bless.  Rather 
join a little in the cursing.  And if you have been done a great wrong, 
then quickly add five little ones: a gruesome sight is a person single-
mindedly obsessed by a wrong.  A little revenge is more human than 
no revenge.” Reacting to an insult with an insult maintains a space 
for conflict and difference between the two that prevents any 
lingering ressentiment.  
In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche’s resentments appear measured and 
deliberate, not vengeful: 
 
I forbid myself all countermeasures, all protective measures, and, as is 
only fair, also any defense, any ‘justification,’ in cases when some small 
or very great folly is perpetrated against me.  My kind of retaliation 
consists in following up the stupidity as fast as possible with some good 
sense: that way one may actually catch up with it.  Metaphorically 
speaking, I send a box of confections to get rid of a painful story. (“Wise” 
§5)  
 
The idea of reciprocating the affront suggests equality between 
offender and offended.  Nietzsche “thanks” his opponents as a way to 
compensate the original affront, whether the affront is an insult or a 
helpful gesture.  Gratitude is the riposte that enables strong 
characters to maintain their strength, “it is a milder form of revenge” 
(“Wise” §5).  Where there is no need to despise, hate, fear or harm 
those who intrude, an agonistic friendship can be maintained 
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through gratitude, or as William Connolly suggests, laughter.  
Resentment actively divests the intrusion by actively and sometimes 
cheerfully affirming oneself as a worthy opponent: 
 
Ressentiment is stored resentment that has poisoned the soul and 
migrated to places where it is hidden and denied.  Nothing said here 
about ressentiment implies that it is never appropriate to act out of 
resentment. . . . Ressentiment is the thing to struggle against, then, 
particularly when it becomes folded into established practices of law.  So 
laugh off those fools who think they have 'caught you in a contradiction' 
if you resent their misrepresentations of their beliefs.  Laughing here can 
both express resentment and fend off its tendency to flow into the form 
of the ressentiment you resist.36 
 
Resentment, expressed through laughter delivers a burst of 
particularity to those fed up with the mass psychology of seriousness 
and internalized cruelty.  This externalization of what would 
otherwise become an infection entails a certain amount of risk.  The 
externalization of one’s resentment, as an action, cannot know ahead 
of time what will happen in response.  But, unlike revenge, where 
the return blow can be anticipated, resentment does not secure its 
fate.  Rather, it interrupts the legacy of Christianity by introducing a 
new type of reaction.  Resentment in other words, resists oppressive 
collective culture.37 Enacted resentments are also owed to oneself as 
a matter of personal well-being and to others as a matter of respect:  
 
It also seems to me that the rudest word, the rudest word, the rudest 
letter are still more benign, more decent than silence.  Those who 
remain silent are almost always lacking in delicacy and courtesy of heart.  
Silence is an objection; swallowing things leads of necessity to a bad 
character—it even upsets the stomach.  All who remain silent are 
dyspeptic.” (“Wise” §5) 
 
                                                
36 William Connolly, Ethos of Pluralization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1995), 214. 
37 Resentment, I would like to suggest, resists oppressive collective culture (a 
culture that disavows the value and meaningfulness of contestation) without also 
thereby denying the value of collective action.  More work needs to be done to 
show whether Nietzsche’s individualism could allow for and value collectivity.  I 
consider that work beyond the scope of this paper.  
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Resentments can be understood as healthy reactions insofar as they 
externalize feelings and desires that are otherwise swallowed 
without having been chewed first, so to speak.  The healthy person 
can integrate good and bad experiences more easily and readily; “he 
digests his experiences as he digests his meals, even when he has to 
swallow some tough morsels” (Genealogy of Morals III §17)..  The 
‘man of ressentiment’ suffers from repressed vengefulness whereas 
healthier types digest or express their aggression more readily.  
The ability to act upon and thereby digest one’s resentments 
protects the subject from internalized aggression that festers and 
becomes a poisonous feeling of victimization. “Ressentiment itself, if 
it should appear in the noble man, consummates and exhausts itself 
in an immediate reaction, and therefore does not poison: on the 
other hand, it fails to appear at all on countless occasions on which it 
inevitably appears in the weak and impotent.” Those who can 
effectuate ressentiment rather than succumb to it are said to have “a 
certain imprudence, perhaps a bold recklessness whether in the face 
of danger or of the enemy, or that enthusiastic impulsiveness in 
anger, love, reverence, gratitude, and revenge.” When one reacts un-
self-consciously to insult, one “shakes off with a single shrug many 
vermin that eat deep into others” (Genealogy of Morals I §10).  
Resentment is, in this sense, a felt experience of creative distancing 
from of ressentiment. 
Moreover, the subject who reacts immediately with a riposte 
is “a hundred steps closer to justice” not because he or she does not 
react, but precisely because the reaction tries to restore order by 
imposing “measure and bounds on the excesses of the reactive 
pathos,” by “substituting for revenge the struggle against the 
enemies of peace and order.” Active reactions, according to 
Nietzsche, seek a means of “putting an end to the senseless raging of 
ressentiment” (Genealogy of Morals II §11).  In other words, active 
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reactions can work in the interest of justice, whereas reactions 
overwhelmed by ressentiment cannot.  The development of the 
distinction between actively reacting and passively reacting in 
Genealogy, I argue, can be developed into a functional distinction 
between resentment and ressentiment.  
Granting that the crucial distinction of health in Nietzsche’s 
psychology is made in terms of active/passive or 
externalized/internalized reactions, actively externalizing one’s 
reactions rather than swallowing them is the Nietzschean variation 
of my claim that one’s resentments, in order to resist harm and 
affirm oneself, must be enacted.  In doing so, they become 
externalized and thereby lighten one’s load and maintain 
particularity.  An apparent paradox of Nietzschean resentment 
remains: while resentment is a kind of feeling and thus internal (not 
an action), it can also be externalized and hence become an action.  
Resentment is therefore both a pathos (feeling) and action (active 
reaction).  
 
III.2 Resentment as Affirmation—Having interpreted these healthy 
reactions as enacted resentments that externalize (rather than 
project) conflict and difference, resentment is shown to have an 
active relationship to ressentiment.  Resentment, I argue, is not 
cathartic, but rather creatively disruptive for the subject of 
ressentiment.  Granting this, resentment is redeemed against any 
tendency to view all reactions within Nietzsche's work as self-
deluding and inherently disempowering.  
Another way to articulate the distinction is to show 
experientially how the claims of ressentiment and resentment differ.  
On the one hand, resentment’s claim properly understood is 
something like this: I value my life as meaningful and am therefore 
ready and willing to defend it through contest.  The person who 
Redeeming Resentment 
 
145 
expresses her resentments therefore names herself and affirms her 
worth; resentment signals self-affirmation38 that may or may not be 
at odds with the beliefs of the community.  The claim of resentment 
also does not need to affirm self-value in comparison to others. 
“Who is it,” Deleuze asks, “that begins by saying ‘I am good’? It is 
certainly not the one who compares himself to others, not the one 
who compares his actions and his works to superior and 
transcendent values.”39 The claim of ressentiment, on the other 
hand, says something like the following: since I am suffering and 
you aren’t, you are evil and I'm good.  The claim of ressentiment 
begins with the fact of suffering in comparison to others, followed by 
the degradation of others and finally with self-affirmation.  
Deleuze’s depiction of the claim highlights the fact that 
responsibility and self-empowerment are missing from 
ressentiment:  “It is your fault if no one loves me, it is your fault if 
I’ve failed in life and also your fault if you fail in yours, your 
misfortunes and mine are equally your fault.”40 Since ressentiment 
experiences everything as an affront (it cannot avoid anything since 
it can forget nothing) the whole world becomes hostile.  In order to 
find value for itself the subject of ressentiment must disparage and 
thereby detract in value the external world.  A person who 
experiences her resentments, however, names herself as being 
                                                
38 Who is this self that can reflexively affirm? Admittedly, I have here smuggled a 
"self" into my interpretation of Nietzsche.  For resentment to be affirmative in a 
way that is empowering, it seems that it can’t merely riposte, but riposte in 
defense of something worthy of defending.  And to have something worthy of 
defending one would need to step back from the immediacy of the drives and 
affects and make a kind of self-reflective evaluation.  But what is a self for 
Nietzsche? Lanier Anderson, in "Nietzsche's Conception of the Self,” offers an 
excellent account of a middle way between naturalistic readings of Nietzsche that 
effectively deny any type of self beyond a mere bundle of affects and drives, and 
Kantian readings that read an autonomous, self-reflective subjectivity in 
Nietzsche's philosophy.  
39 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 119. 
40 Ibid., (my emphasis).  
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worthy of respect and finds distance from the original affront 
through its expression.  Note that this active expression does not 
need to be an action in relation to the aggressor since resentment is, 
as I mentioned, both a feeling and action; one can be privately 
resentful, which is another way of saying that inactivity cannot be 
equated with passivity.41 She will also find herself, however, 
delegitimizing the institution that validates demands of suffering.  
Affirmative resentment, as we find it in Nietzsche, is therefore 
empowering only as much as it is alienating.  Particularity in 
Nietzsche is secured for oneself against collectivity and therefore 
brings with it loneliness. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
By illuminating the plurality of protests to come out of the reaction 
to suffering, this paper challenges the widely held belief that 
resentment is merely reactive, passive and determined.  Nietzsche’s 
middle and late work shows us that there are active and passive 
reactions to suffering and that the externalization of such reactions 
is empowering. 
With an emphasis on the value of active reactions, we see that 
subjects of ressentiment use the fact of subordinate standing as 
proof of the immorality of the values against which they feel judged.  
Both resentment and ressentiment are connected to beliefs about 
what is due, and each expresses itself as a self-righteous protest.  But 
the distinguishing structural feature between resentment and 
ressentiment turns out to be the relationship each tends to have to 
suffering.  The claim of resentment as I have developed and 
defended it is a felt reaction to suffering that divests the hurt of its 
                                                
41 For an extended discussion of the value of resignation as an active type of 
nihilism, see Book One of Will to Power.   
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potential to become internalized and is experienced as empowering.  
Ressentiment strives for the “triumph of the weak as weak.” 
Resentment, I maintain, represents an attempt to restore self-
affirmation and difference through the enactment of reaction.  
In order to recuperate the possibility of empowered 
resentment within Nietzsche's work, I first developed his critique of 
Christianity according to its three developmental stages.  
Distinguishing morality according to the varied stages of 
ressentiment supports my view that it is the socialization of this 
repression according to the ascetic ideals and finally, the Christian 
moral legacy of this internalization that entail ressentiment, not 
individual psychology.  Second, and within human psychology of the 
individual, there remains a plurality of reactions to suffering.  By 
identifying what Nietzsche himself described as active and passive 
reactions, I was able to redeem a kind of active reaction at the level 
of force, the fundamental physiological unit of Nietzsche's 
psychology.  Our individual psychology is not reducible to 
ressentiment (since it must be organized and mobilized according to 
an external ideal); we can conceive of experiences of resentment that 
are not a symptom of ressentiment.  In other words, an experience 
of emancipatory resentment can be grounded in Nietzsche's critique 
of morality.  Finally, I recuperate the individual experience of 
resentment as an affirmation of one's own freedom against the 
ascetic designation that all suffering be taken seriously.  When we 
allow ourselves to feel our resentment without lingering in it, we 
prevent the feeling of suffering from becoming the determining 
value of our lives.  Resentment, as that which actively reacts through 
riposte or self-affirmation, brings with it a feeling of freedom despite 
the fact of suffering.    
 
